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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
16232 
WALTER PRESTON BOGGESS, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by complaint and information 
with one count of second degree murder in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury of eight persons 
on May 18, 1978. The Honorable J. Robert Bullock of the 
Fourth Judicial District presided. The jury found appellant 
guilty of Qanslaughter and he was sentenced, following a 
presentence report, to a term of one to fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction 
and sentence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the afternoon of March 2, 1978, appellant and 
his wife, Ta=y, were sitting across from each other at 
their kitchen table (T. at 22). Appellant was snoking 
a pipe of marijuana (T. at 27), and playing with his 
pistol (T. at 22), a single-action .44 magnum caliber 
revolver (T. at 41). He was pointing the gun at various 
objects in the room and "dry-firing" it, or causing t~ 
gun to operate without anununition (T. at 74). He had 
loaded and unloaded the gun at least once as they were 
sitting there (T. at 55). Tammy asked that he unload the 
gun. Appellant responded by pointing the gun at his wife 
and saying, "it's not loaded," as he fanned it or held the 
trigger and caused the hammer to strike. The gun went ofi· 
striking Tammy in the chest (T. at 55). She later died 
from the wound (T. at 87). 
The police responded to a telephone call from 
appellant and found Tammy nearly dead, lying on the floor 
( 18) 1 h ld . th baby and sobbing T. at • Appel ant was o ing e 
(T. at 19) • Later, after being advised of his rights, 
-2-
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appellant gave several statements (T. at 21 and 54). He 
admitted shooting his wife and that he did not know why he 
had shot her. He said that what he had done was a "Hell 
of a way to show it (the gun) was unloaded." lie further 
noted that he should have looked to see if the gun was 
loaded but did not (T. at 55-56). An FBI expert testified 
that the victim had been shot from very close range {T. 
at 69). 
After both sides had rested, appellant's attorney 
informed the court in chambers of information he had received 
indicating that one of the jurors had stated before the 
trial that he would like to "hang appellant for killing his 
wife." (T. at 111). No affidavit or testimony was presented 
and defense counsel reserved the right to move for a mistrial 
until after the verdict had come in (T. at 112). 
The jury was instructed on both second degree murder 
and manslaughter (R. at 16-18). No objections were made to 
the jury instructions (T. at 110). Appellant was found 
guilty of manslaughter (R. at 26) and no motion for mistrial 
was ever made. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE BECAUSE 
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE IS NOT AN INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
Hl\tlSLAUGHTER OR SECOND DEGREE l1URDER, SUCH AN 
INSTRUCTION WAS NOT REQUESTED, l\UD THERE HAS NO 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A VERDICT OF NEGLIGENT 
HmncrnE. 
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Utah Code Ann.§ 76-1-402(3) (1953) 
' as amended, 
defines lesser included offense as when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the 
sane or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the (greater) 
offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicita-
tion, conspiracy, or form of preparation to 
car.unit the offense charged or an-offense 
otherwise included therein; or, 
(c) It is specifically designated by 
statute as a lesser included offense. 
Negligent homicide is not specifically designatec 
as an included offense of manslaughter,· and neither is it 
any form of attempt or preparation to commit homicide sine. 
the ultimate end proscribed by both crimes, the death oft 
victim, is the same. If negligent homicide is included 
within the crime of manslaughter, it must be so under 
subsection (a) of Section 76-1-402 (3). Subsection (a) is 
a codification of preexisting Utah law. As this Court 
noted in State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 
(1962): 
The rule as to when one offense is included 
in another is that the greater offense includes 
a lesser one when establishment of the greater 
would necessarily include proof of all of the 
elements necessary to prove the lesser. 
Conversely, it is only when the proof of the 
lesser offense requires some element not 
involved in the greater offense that the lesser 
would not be an included offense. 
13 Utah 2d at 198. 
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It is readily apparent that proof of manslaughter 
or second degree murder does not establish proof of the 
crime of negligent homicide. In fact, proof of second 
degree murder or manslaughter disproves any possibility of 
negligent homicide. 
As appellant notes, the major difference in these 
crimes is the state of mind required to establish each 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 7). The portion of the second 
degree murder statute applicable to this case, subsections 
(a), (b) and (c) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1) (1953), as 
amended, provide: 
(1) criminal homicide constitutes murder 
in the second degree if the actor: 
(a) Intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another; or 
(b) Intending to cause serious bodily 
injury to another, he commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death 
of another; or 
(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing 
a depraved indifference to human life, he 
recklessly engaged in conduct which creates a 
grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another. 
The requisite mental element may be restated as that the 
actor must either intend to cause death or great harm or 
that the actor be reckless. 
Manslaughter is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-205 (1953), as amended: 
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i 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) Recklessly causes the death of 
another; or 
(b) Causes the death of another under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse; 
(c) Causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide a moral 
or legal justification or extenuation for 
his conduct although the conduct is not 
legally justifiable or excusable under the 
existing circumstances. 
Manslaughter thus requires that the actor recklessly kill, 
or kill while reasonably disturbed, or with a reasonable 
though mistaken belief that he is justified. In t~ 
latter two instances, the actor intends to cause the deatr. 
of the victim but kills because of emotional upset 
or mistake. State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237, 240 (Utah 191f 
LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law, 1972 § 76; and \qharton's 
Criminal Law and Procedure, 1957, Vol. I § 272. 
For either of these two er imes, second degree 
murder or nanslaughter, the actor must know or intend that 
death will result or he must act recklessly. Recklessnes: 
is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (3) (1953)' as 
amended, as when the actor: 
is aware of but consciously 
• · · f · ble disregards a substantial and un)usti ia 
risk that the circumstances exist or the 
result will occur. The risk must be of d 
d h t ·ts disregar such a nature and egree t a 1 t ndarc 
constitutes a gross deviation from the 5 a ·i"se ld exerc · · 
of care that an ordinary person ":"ou from the 
under all the circumstances as viewed 
actor's standpoint. 
-6- b 
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Recklessness requires that the actor be aware of the risk 
of his actions but that he ignore the risk. To establish 
second degree murder or manslaughter, then, the state 
must prove that the actor knew that death would or might 
result and yet acted anyway. 
Negligent homicide, however, is defined in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (1953), as amended: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
negligent homicide if the actor, acting 
with criminal negligence, causes the 
death of another. 
Criminal negligence is when the actor: 
• • • ought to be aware of a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise in all the circumstances 
as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (1953), as amended (emphasis added). 
The use of the terms "ought to be aware" and "failure to 
perceive" imply that the actor is not in fact aware of the 
risk caused by his actions. 
Clearly, an actor cannot both know of the risk of 
death or intend death as required for second degree murder 
or manslaughter, and also not know of the risk, even though 
he should, as required for negligent homicide. Proof of one 
m"nlal state inherently disproves the other. It follows, 
-7-
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under Brennan, supra, and Section 76-1-402(3), that 
negligent homicide is not an included offense of 
manslaughter. 
In State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d a: 
(1970), this Court outlined when a court must instruct a 
jury as to lesser offenses: 
One of the foundational principles 
in regard to the submission of issues to 
the juries is that where the parties so 
request they are entitled to have 
instructions given upon their theory of 
the case; and this includes on lesser 
offenses if any reasonable view of the 
evidence would support such a verdict. 
Id. at 812 (emphasis added). See also State v. Mitchell, 
3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P. 2d 618, 621 (1955). 
Initially, it must be noted that appellant raade 
no objection to the instructions as they were given to tr 
jury (T. at 110). As a threshold !'latter, an appellant 
may not claim error in failure to instruct on lesser ofk 
unless he requested such instruction, Gillian, supra. I: 
this case, however, even if appellant had requested an 
instruction on negligent homicide, no reasonable view of 
the evidence could have supported such a verdict. 
made out negligent homicide, the evidence would have had. 
have shown that appellant was unaware that pointing a gu: 
· vervt'· 
towards his wife from point blank range and doing e · 
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mechanically necessary to fire the gun constituted a 
risk. Such naivete in a grown man is unbelievable. 
Moreover, appellant indicated that he appreciated the 
danger associated with the weapon. He stated that he 
should have looked to see if the gun was unloaded, but 
did not (T. at 56, lines 6-7). He noted that his action 
was a "Hell of a way to show it's unloaded" (T. at 55 
and 103-104). Even though he thought the gun was 
unloaded, appellant knew it was dangerous to do what 
he did. No reasonable view of the evidence could lead 
to the view that he did not. The logical conclusion, then, 
in light of Gillian, supra, is that the trial court was 
correct in not instructing the jury on the elements of 
negligent homicide because (a) the instruction was not 
requested, and (b) no reasonable view of the evidence 
could support a jury verdict of negligent homicide. 
Appellant argues that even though an instruction 
on negligent homicide was not requested, it was erroneous 
for the court to fail to give such an instruction under 
State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976) (Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 4-5). Dougherty applies to lesser included 
offenses. As has been shown, infra, negligent homicide 
is not a lesser included offense of second degree murder 
or manslaughter. Nevertheless, even if it is assumed, 
argu~ndo, that negligent homicide was a lesser included 
-9-
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offense, there was no error in the court's failure to 
instruct on negligent homicide. A 1 g't' t e i ima e, recognized 
trial tactic is to avoid instruction on lesser included 
offenses in hopes of obtaining outright acquittal, 
State v. Mitchell, supra at 621. Moreover, appellant 
misreads State v. Dougherty, supra. In that case, this 
Court considered Lisby v. State, 83 Nev. 183, 414 P.2d 59; 
(1966), and stated: 
The court discussed three situations in 
which the problem of lesser included offensu 
are frequently encountered. First, where there 
is evidence which would absolve the defendant 
from guilt of a greater offense, or degree, b~ 
would support a finding of guilt of a lesser 
offense, or degree; the instruction is mandatory. 
Second, where the evidence would not support 
a finding of guilt in the commission of the 
lesser offense or degree. For example, the 
defendant denies any complicity in the crime 
charged, and thus lays no foundation for any 
internediate verd'ict; or where the elements 
of the offenses differ, and some element 
essential to the lesser offense is either n~ 
proved or shown not to exist. This second 
situation renders an instruction on a leser 
included offense erroneous, because it is n~ 
pertinent. 
Third is an intermediate situation. One 
' · lud• where the elements of the greater offense inc · 
all the elements of the lesser offense; because, 
by its very nature, the greater offense could. 
0 
not have been comnitted without defendant.havin, 
the intent in doing the acts, which const~tute. 
the lesser offense In such a situation inst'.uc_ 
tions on the le3se; included offense may be give 
because all elements of the lesser of fe~se ~ft 
been proved. However, such an instruction riayt 
- t'on has me properly be refused if the prosecu l ~ 
. h t r offense, a its burden of proof on t e grea e 
-10-
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there is no evidence tending to reduce the 
grea~er offen~e. The court concluded by 
stating that if there be any evidence, 
however slight, on any reasonab1e theory of 
the case under which the defendant rnight be 
convicted of.a lesser included offense, the 
court must, if requested, give an appropriate 
instruction. (Emphasis added.) 
As may be seen, the court is required to instruct the jury 
as to a lesser included offense in the absence of a request 
to do so only when "there is evidence which would absolve 
the defendant from guilt of a greater offense or degree, 
but would support a finding of guilt of a lesser offense." 
There was no such evidence in this case. On the contrary, 
the evidence clearly indicated that appe1lant knew that 
pointing a gun at his wife and "fanning it" constituted an 
unreasonable risk. There· \las no evidence to indicate that 
appellant did not know that handling a gun in this manner 
was foolish and dangerous. He may have thought that 
he could avoid the possible harm, he may have even thought 
he had taken precautions but he still knew that what he did 
was a "Hell of a way to show it was not 1oaded." The 
inherent danger in the use of firearms p1us the ever present 
possibility that they may not be completedly unloaded make 
the act of pointing a gun at someone and pulling the 
trigger a substantial and unjustifiable risk even if the 
actor thinks the bullets have all been removed. There was 
no evinence to show that appellant did not know of this 
-11-
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risk. The trial court did not err in failing to instruct 
the jury on negliqent honicide absent a request to do so. 
In fact, even if negligent homicide were a lesser includE 
offense of second degree murder and/or manslaughter, whic' 
it is not, and even if appellant had requested an instruc: 
on negligent homicide, which he did not, the trial court 
would have been correct in not instructing the jury on 
negligent honicide because the evidence sinply would not 
have supported such a verdict. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IU FAILING TO DECLAP: 
A MISTRIAL SINCE APPELLANT NEVER MOVED TO HAVE A 
HISTRIAL DECLARED; NEVER PRESENTED COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE THAT JUROR BIAS EXISTED; AND THE JURY 
RETURNED THE LEAST ONEROUS VERDICT POSSIBLE Ill 
LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Al though it is true that bias unrevealed in voir 
dire in one of the jurors night be grounds for a new tria: 
State v. Morgan, 23 Utah 212, 64 Pac. 356 (1901), thatbii 
must be clearly established. In State v. Hickle, 25 Utah 
70 Pac. 856 (1902), the court held that even though 
affidavits indicated bias in one of the jurors, theu~v 
conflicting affidavits and the verdict was affirmed: 
While it is well settled that when, in a 
criminal case, a juror has, before his . 
( . d'cat1ng selection, made statements • • • in i iere 
prejudgment and bias) and such statements ~ 
unknown to either the accused or his a~torney 
until after the trial, a verdict of guilty 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
should, on motion of the accused, if Made in 
proper time, be set aside and a new trial 
granted ••• (citations omitted) it is also 
an equally well settled rule of law that the 
verdict of guilty should not be set aside 
on ~uch gro~nds except when it is clearly and 
satisfactorily made to appear on motion for a 
new trial that the juror, previous to his 
examination on voir dire, made the prejudicial 
statements alleged, and the onus of showing that 
fact is upon the accused. 
Id. at 848 (emphasis added). 
In a more recent case, this Court has noted: 
our major concern in this, as in 
any case, is with the lawfulness and justice 
of a conviction; and notwithstanding a showing 
of minor impropriety or irregularity, there 
should be no reversal of a conviction unless 
it appears that a party has been prejudiced in 
that in the absence of such impropriety there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the verdict 
would have been different. 
State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1977). 
In the instant matter, a motion for a mistrial was 
never made. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-3 (1953), as amended, 
provides: 
When a verdict or decision has been 
rendered against the defendant the court 
may, upon his aoplication, grant a new 
trial. • • • (Emphasis added.) 
There was no duty for the trial court to declare a 
mistrial, sua sponte. Appellant's attorney reserved the 
right to move for a mistrial following the return of the 
verdict but never so moved (T. at 112). The only evidence 
before the court indicating the possibility of juror bias 
-13-
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was some double hearsay submitted by appellant's attorney 
(T. at 111). No affidavits were ever submitted, nor was 
any testimony heard. One could hardly say that appellant 
had met his burden of establishing bias. 
Even if the bias is admitted, however, appellant 
was not harmed by it. Whether appellant had actually 
killed his wife was not at issue. VirtuallY all of 
appellant's actions were established or substantiat~ 
by his own testimony. Given the nature of the act (see 
Point I, infra), the only question for the jury was whetlle 
appellant had the mental state required for second degree 
murder or manslaughter. The unanimous jury verdict was 
that he had only acted recklessly, not intentional~. U 
the bias was present, it was overcome since the verdict oi 
guilty of manslaughter was the least onerous verdict thH 
could reasonably have arrived at. 
Appellant never sought a mistrial nor presented 
competent evidence concerning juror bias. The lightest 
possible verdict was returned by the jury. There was no 
error in the court's failure to declare a mistrial 00 W 
own motion. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS llOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL. 
. . •rurner, This Court has enunciated in Alires v . .:-=------
-14-
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Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969), the test to be utilized 
whenever the question of ineffective counsel is raised. 
In Alires, supra, the Court first stated that " ••• we 
do not reverse for mere error or irregularity, but only 
where it is substantial and prejudicial." Id. at 120. 
The Court then stated that the right of an 
accused to counsel is included in the concept of due 
process of law, embodied as it is in the United States 
and Utah Constitutions. The requirement of counsel, said 
the Court: 
is not satisfied by a sham or 
pretense of an appearance in the record by 
an attorney who manifests no real concern 
about the interests of the accused. 
Id. at 121. 
Inunediately following the above quoted sentence, 
the Court turns its attention to the standard required by 
due process to be applied to appointed counsel: 
The entitlement is to the assistance of a 
competent member of the Bar, who shows a 
willingness to identify himself with the 
interests of the defendant and present such 
defenses as are available to him under the 
law and consistent with the ethics of the 
profession. 
~· at 121. 
This standard has been consistently reaffirmed. 
See Johnson v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 439, 473 P.2d 901 (1970); 
-15-
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Kryger v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 214, 479 P.2d 480 (1971); 
State v. r1cNicol, 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976). 
In the instant matter, appellant contends that 
he was denied effective counsel because of three errors: 
(1) failure to present a negligent homicide theory ~ ~ 
case, (2) failure to move for a mistrial, and (3) failuro 
to perfect a timely appeal (Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-13), 
As has been noted, a legitimate, recognized tac:: 
of defense counsel is to avoid instruction on lesser offE; 
in hopes of obtaining outright acgui ttal, State v. flitchE: 
supra at 621. Negligent homicide is not an included offer 
of second degree r:mrder or rnanslaughter and the evidence: 
this case simply would not reasonably have supported a 
negligent hornicide verdict. Appellant's attorney is helc 
under Alires, supra, to present only legitimate argument;, 
The failure to argue negligent hornicide in this case was 
certainly not violative of that standard. 
The failure to rnove for a mistrial is also not 
error, prejudicial or otherwise. The verdict of thej~ 
was as favorable as could have been hoped for, given the 
evidence in the case. Even if the rnotion for a mistrial 
been made and successfully supported by the necessacy 
f . that at_)pellant could e· af idavits, it is highly unlikely 
· d · t fro~. an'' other J'ury. 1 receive a less burdensome ver ic "' " 
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admitted shooting his wife (T. at 55 and 57). He adMitted 
that his act was a fooolish risk (T. at 55-56). The fact 
that the jurc' found him guilty of the lesser of the offenses 
charged was as good as he could have hoped for. It would 
have been a r,istake for his attorney to have moved for a 
mistrial following such a verdict. 
Finally, although it may have been improper for 
appellant's attorney to have failed to file a timely appeal, 
the fact that the court is considering the instant appeal 
demonstrates the lack of prejudice to the appellant. More-
over, there ~ere no issues of merit to be considered in an 
appeal. 
Appellant's attorney at trial was active and involved. 
He participated in vigorous cross-examination of the state's 
witnesses and successfuly convinced the jury that his client 
was not guilty of the greater offense of second degree murder. 
Although he did recognize the impropriety of having a biased 
juror, he also wisely chose to not disturb a relatively 
favorable ju~? verdict. He did not fail to provide appellant 
with effective assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Negligent homicide is not an included offense of 
manslaughter or second degree murder. The court was not 
requested to instruct the jury as to negligent homicide and 
f~ilu1e to do so in any event was not error since the 
-17-
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evidence of the case could not have reasonably supported 
such a verdict. 
Appellant never moved for a mistrial because of 
juror bias nor was competent evidence ever produced 
demonstrating such bias. In any event, the jury returned 
the least onerous verdict reasonably possible under the 
evidence indicating that if any bias existed, it was 
overcome. 
Appellant was not denied effective assistan~cl 
counsel since his attorney actively participated in his 
defense and successfully convinced the jury that appellant 
was guilty of a lesser offense than that charged, even 
though appellant admitted killing his wife. 
Respondent consequently urges this Court to sus 
the conviction and sentence of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney Gen 
Attorneys for Respondent 
-18-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~ Q£. CONTENTS 
NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE 
I tl L 0 WE R C 0 U RT ............. , . , ....... , , , ........ , .. . 
NATURE OF RELIEF ................................ , ..... . 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................ , ... ,........ 5 
ARGUMENT ................................... ,, ......... . 
I. 
I I. 
I I I. 
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IT'S ACTION 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE 
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT, WHICH 
JUDGMENT WAS BASED ON A HEARING UNDER 
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DENIED THE DEFENDANT 
THE RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED BY HER 
COUNSEL AND THE RIGHT TO PRESENT MATTERS 
IN HER DEFENSE ................................. . 
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT 
AGAINST DEFENDANT WHEREIN AT THE HEARING 
ON SAID MOT I ON FOR 'SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE 
COURT DID NOT HAVE BEFORE IT, DUE TO 
CLERICAL ERROR, THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE 
DEFENDANT WHICH WAS SUBMITTED IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ............. ··················· 
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
VACATE THE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT, 
WHEREIN SAID JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED IN THE 
ABSENCE OF DEFENDANT AND IN THE ABSENCE OF 
HER ATTORNEY, AND SAi D ABSENCE WAS DUE TO 
A CONFLICT IN DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY'S 
SCHEDULE AND THE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE 
PART OF THE LOWER COURT IN RE FUS I NG TO 
GRANT A CONTINUANCE, EVEN THOUGH BOTH 
PARTIES TO THE ACTION, THROUGH THEIR 
ATTORNEYS, HAD AGREED THAT THE MATTER MIGHT 
BE CONT I NUED ...... ·. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · '. '.'.' 
5 
5 
7 
s 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
counterclaimed against Plaintiff setting forth the fact~-,, 
Defendant turned over the person a I property which .·ias sec,• 
for the personal note and further alleged that Plaintiff 
failed to provide the Defendant notice of the disposition,' 
personal property as required by Section 70 A-9-503, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. Defendant's countercla:-
was for $10,000.00, plus the amount provided for in the 
formula set up by Section 70 A-9-504, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. By virtue of the amount of the counterc:, 
the Cir::uit Court lost jurisdiction and the pleadings and 
papers in the Circuit Court file were forwarded to the 
Clerk of the District Court of Salt Lake County. I t s nou I: 
be noted that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, it'; 
notice thereof, reply to counterclaim and attached exhioit 0 
were all filed with the Circuit Court for Salt Lake County, 
Murray Department, with the case number assigned by the Cl; 
of that Court. The Plaintiff, as a basis for the Motion 
for Summary Judgment, submitted an Affidavit signed by 
Leona rd Cenat i em po, vii th exhibits attached, setting fort~ 
facts the Plaintiff alleged were sufficient grounds to 
indicate Defendant had received notice of the sale and, 
therefore, sufficient to form the basis for a summaryjucc 
against the Defendant. 
Defendant, in response thereto, filed an Affidavi: 
the Circuit Court, Murray Department, setting forth the;;. 
in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion. The aforementioned 
-2-
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Affidavit 't1as filed with the Clerk of the District Court, 
but due to the fact that the Affidavit still bore the 
Circuit Court number, it did not get into the District Court 
file and was unavailable to Judge Taylor at the time the 
case came on for hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On the day set for hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
an agreement was reached between the attorney for Plaintiff 
and attorney for Defendant, based on the fact that the 
attorney for Defendant had a conflict in that he had to 
appear at a trial in the case of Paris Company v. Hans 
Siebold at the same time the Motion for Summary Judgment 
was to be heard before Judge Taylor. It was agreed by both 
attorneys that due to the conflict, the matter of the hearing 
on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment could be 
continued. The Law and Motion Division of the District 
Court, acting through Judge Taylor, notwithstanding a request 
by an associate of Plaintiff's attorney, proceeded to render 
judgment against Defendant on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The judgment was rendered by Judge Taylor without 
having before him Defendant's Affidavit in opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion and without Defendant being afforded the 
opportunity to be represented and present matters in defense 
of her case. 
After being advised of Judge Taylor's action and 
· · h d d b the attorney for Plaintiff, rece1v1ng t e Or er prepare Y 
Defendant's attorney ascertained that the Affidavit of 
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Defendant had not reached the District Court file. A copy 
of the original Affidavit v1as f i I ed and a Supp I emental 
Affidavit was filed and a Motion to Vacate the Judgment .. ias 
f i I ed. After a hearing before Judge Taylor on November J, 
1 9 7 8 , the Co u rt den i e d Defend an t ' s Mot i on to Vacate the 
judgment. It is from this Order that Defendant appeals. 
NATURE OF RELIEF 
Appellant, by this appeal, asks the court to rule as 
f o I l 01·1 s: 
1. That the lower court erred in it's action in 
denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate the judgment against 
Defendant, which judgment was based on a hearing under 
circumstances that denied the Defendant the right to be 
represented by her counsel and the right to present matter; 
in her defense. 
2. That the lower court erred in denying Defendanl' 
Motion to Vacate the judgment against Defendant wherein at 
the hearing on said Motion for Summary Judgment, the court 1 
did not have before it, due to clerical error, the Affidav:: 
of the Defendant, which was submitted in opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. That the lower court erred in refusing to vacat< 
the judgment against Defendant, 1-1herein said judgment"' 5 
rendered the absence of in the absence of Defendant and in 
C orflict in her attorney, and said absence was due to a 
-4-
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Defendant's attorney's schedule and the abuse of discretion 
on the part of the lower court in refusing to grant a 
continuance, even though both parties to the action, through 
their attorneys had agreed that the matter might be continued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case for the purposes of this appeal 
have been Summarized above in the Na tu re of the Case and 
Disposition of Case in Lower Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
1. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IT'S ACTION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANT, WHICH JUDGMENT WAS BASED ON A HEARING UNDER 
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DENIED THE DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO BE 
REPRESENTED BY HER COUNSEL AND THE RIGHT TO PRESE~T MATTERS 
IN HER DEFENSE. 
The principle applied by this court in the case of 
Griffith v. Hammon, Utah , 560 P2d 1375, (1977), 
is applicable to the instant case. This court held that the 
trial court erred in not setting aside a default judgment 
entered '"here the Defendants failed to appear at the trial 
and where the Defendants had properly objected to the trial 
date based upon their counse I's i nab i Ii ty to appear because 
-5-
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of a previously scheduled appearance in another district 
court at the same time. In the instant case where the 'atte 
came on for hearing on the Law and Motion Calendar as Op)o;e: 
to the Trial Calendar, which was the case in Griffith v. Ha·-
and where the re •t1as an agreement be tween the parties that 1., 
matter co u l d be cont i nu e d a t no i n con v en i enc e or prejudice 
to anyone concerned, and the Court so advised, the reasons 
for vacating the judgment rendered in Defendant's absence 
are even more persuasive here than those in Griffith v. Ham:·, 
The case of Warren v. Dixon Ranch Company, et a I., 123 Utah 
416, 260 P2d 741 (1953), is also apropos In that case, 
the Supreme Court, in referring to the trial court's 
discretion, said, 
"(The trial court) may exercise wide judicial 
discretion in weighing the factors of fairness 
and pub I i c con v en i enc e , and the Supreme Court 
on appeal will reverse the trial court only 
where abuse of such discretion is clearly 
shown. 11 
It is urged by Appellant herein that the factors of fairnei; 
weigh heavily in favor of Appellant, being allowed to prese;:, 
her case before the Court. The case of Mayhew v. Stand.!Li 
Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P2d 351 (1962), in 
discussing the discretion of the trial court, states that, 
"(The trial court) cannot act arbitrarily and 
should be generally indulgent toward permitting 
full inquiry and knowledge of disputes so that 
they can be settled advisedly and in conformity 
with law and justice." 
-6-
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The court further stated that, 
"It is ordinarily an abuse of discretion to 
refuse to vacate a default judgment where 
there is reasonable justification or excuse 
for fa i l u re to appear and t i me l y a pp l i cat i 0 n 
is made to set it aside." 
It is submitted by Appellant that the principles 
recited above are persuasive in support of Appellant's 
contention that the lower court erred in denying Appellant's 
Motion to Vacate the judgment which was granted as a result 
of a hearing where Defendant was unable to be present or be 
represented by her counsel. 
POINT I I 
2. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT WHEREIN AT 
THE HEARING ON SAID MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE COURT 
DID NOT HAVE BEFORE IT, DUE TO CLERICAL ERROR, THE AFFIDAVIT 
OF THE DEFENDANT WHICH WAS SUBMITTED IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
With regards to Point II, Appellant respectfully 
invites this Court's attention to the Affidavit of counsel 
for Appellant dated December 8, 1978, wherein the facts 
surrounding the absence of Appel ]ant's counter affidavit to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment are recited and it 
is pointed out in the Affidavit t~at the lower court did not 
have it's counter affidavit for it at the time the hearing 
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on the Motion for Summary Judgment was convened. The 
Affidavit points out the clerical error which resulted io 
the absence of the Affidavit from the file at the time of 
the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court'; 
attention is further invited to the Supplemental Affidavit 
dated December 19, 1978, which, when combined, set forth t'1 
mistake and meritorious defenses which Defendant below woula 
have asserted to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment~a: 
she had the opportunity to be heard at the hearing thereon. 
POINT I I I 
3. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RE FUS I t4G TO VACAH 
THE JUDGMENT AGA I !~ST DEFENDANT, WHEREIN SAID JUDGMENT WAS 
RENDERED IN THE ABSENCE OF DEFENDANT AND I:~ THE ABSENCE Of 
HER ATTORNEY, AND SAi D ABSENCE WAS DUE TO A CONFLICT IN 
DEFENDANT'S ATTOR~EY' S SCHEDULE MID THE ABUSE OF DISCRETIO!I 
ON THE PART OF THE LOWER COURT IN RE FUS I NG TO GRANT A 
CONTINUANCE, EVEN THOUGH BOTH PARTIES TO THE ACTION, THROUGr 
THEIR ATTORNEYS, HAD AGREED THAT THE MATTER MIGHT BE 
CONTINUED. 
The Court's attention is respectfully invited again 
to paragraph 5 of the Affidavit of Appellant's attorney, 
dated December 8, 1978, wherein 
h t bot 0 it is pointed out ta 
parties agreed that the hearing for the Motion for SummarY 
Judgment could be continued and that an attorney from 
• ed C' 
Plaintiff's office requested that the matter be continu 
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stipulation of both parties, but that Judge Taylor refused 
the request and proceeded to render judgment against 
Defendant on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
notwi tnstanding said request. It is submitted that such 
action on the part of Judge Taylor was an abuse of discretion 
and should have formed the basis of the granting of Defendant's 
Motion to Vacate the Summary Judgment rendered as a result 
of the hearing on October 27, 1978. 
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully 
urged that the action of the lower court in denying 
Appellant's Motion to Vacate the Summary Judgment granted as 
a result of the hearing of October 27, 1978, was error such 
as to require the reversal of said order and the rendition 
of an order by this Court which has the effect of allowing 
Appellant to present her defense to Plaintiff's case in the 
lower court. 
STEP EN L. JO NS ON 
431 South Thir East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
8411 0 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
